[Archive] FOREX - Trends, Forecasts and Consequences (Episode 15: May 2012) - page 140
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Market operators are in longs, so a move northwards + rebound from a strong support level is not ruled out from Mon. Video - analytical overview of forex and funds.
The popular Greek newspaper Proto Thema publishes an article in Sunday's issue claiming that Greece is preparing
to impose restrictions on withdrawals from accounts and on the transfer of money abroad. RIA Novosti 02:14
Greece's snap election is set for 17 June . The looming anarchy in Greece, which faces its second election in a month, as well as the general
Experts say the collapse of oil prices could threaten not only Europe but also bring about a new round of global crisis involving Ukraine, the world's second biggest oil exporter, according to a spokesman for the European Commission.
Ukraine may also be involved in the global crisis. The Voice of Ukraine 18.05.12 14:12
The political events in Greece are against the backdrop of the country's population trying to protect themselves in any way they can by withdrawing money from their bank accounts in droves, the head of the Ukrainian Finance Ministry's Finance Ministry's spokesman Oleksandr Lukashenko said on Tuesday.
bank accounts. During the first two days of the week about 1.2 billion euros was withdrawn from deposits in banks, Interfax reported quoting Financial Times.
"We have to explain to Greece that the difficult programme devised for it is the easiest of all options,"
European Commission President José Manuel Barroso said
How the Greek exit threatens the rest of the eurozone
The outside world, outside Greece, especially the remaining members of the Eurozone, will be haunted by the idea that, by breaking the terrible ban, Greece has, by its exit, breached the walls of the monetary union. The irrevocably fixed exchange rate, at which the old drachma was exchanged for the euro in 2001, would de facto no longer be fixed. The currency union will prove to be a soft frost on a hot stove.
Not only Greece, but also the rest of the eurozone will lose credibility. Firstly, a currency union is a bilateral commitment. If the agreement breaks down, both sides are to blame. Secondly, Greece will only leave the Eurozone on the demand of the other countries with active ECB involvement, not voluntarily. And even if it is Greece that will cut the cord, the rest of the Eurozone, led by the European Central Bank, will force it to take the scissors, and everyone understands this very well.
And don't mention the fact that Greece should never have been admitted to the monetary union in the first place, because the authorities deliberately fudged the fiscal information a year before accession to comply with the Maastricht Treaty and continued with the accounting fraud for years afterwards. In the end, Greece did what the rest of the eurozone did before it joined, including what is now proudly called the core or the centre: it deliberately manipulated, distorted and embellished accounting data, only on a different scale. The Eurozone's preventive instrument, the Stability and Growth Pact, would have prevented what happened to Greece had Germany and France not discredited it in 2004, when punitive sanctions had to be applied to them.
Participation in the Eurozone is a bilateral obligation. If Greece fails to honour it and leaves the union, it means the other countries have also failed to honour their obligations. This is not just a punishment for the others. There are very real consequences. If Greece can get out, so can others. It is enough to look at attitudes towards fiscal consolidation in other peripheral countries, as well as in some central ones, to realize that Greece is not alone, and its exit would set a dangerous precedent. Although Greece has it harder than others: its fiscal and economic problems are more severe than those of the other Eurozone countries, leaving the monetary union would show the way for the others to do so.
Once that happens, the markets will pick a new victim, maybe even more than one - the country or countries next in line. Any financially literate banker with accounts in such a country or countries will want to get out at the slightest hint of a threat to leave the Eurozone. Any independent savers who are aware of the risks associated with the potential introduction of the New Escudo, New Irish Pound, New Peseta or New Lira (which are just about the most obvious candidates for exit) would not hesitate to withdraw capital from those countries and place it in other countries that are likely to be there no matter what happens - Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. Of course, the periphery and the "untrustworthy centre", caught in doubt, can open deposits under English or US law to stop the outflow of money, but even that will probably not be enough. After all, if anything, the money will hang in the air for years of litigation.
Apart from the raids on the banks in the countries where the shadow of doubt has fallen, there is no doubt that foreign investors and lenders will bypass their borrowers. Again, if foreign law (mainly English or US law) is used for external (and probably even domestic) financial contracts and instruments, the risks can be mitigated, but the problem will still not be solved.
The withdrawal of funding and deposits from the periphery (in its broadest sense), will provoke a financial panic, which will probably translate into a financial crisis followed by a deep depression in the region. Deposits and funding will flood into the "reliable centre" of the Eurozone, with the threat of monetization of public and bank debt in the European countries being reduced (or eliminated) with ECB support, leading to a rapid appreciation of the euro. Thus, the rest of the Eurozone would not only feel the effects of the financial and economic crisis in the periphery, but also suffer from an uncompetitive exchange rate.
Christine Lagarde, head of the International Monetary Fund, has very rightly highlighted the acute undercapitalization of the European banks. In our opinion, they are not at all prepared for the negative consequences and blows that would fall upon them following the withdrawal of Greece and the threat of a further break-up of the monetary union. European politicians, the ECB and the European regulators have in part compelled Mrs Lagarde to withdraw her warning about the lack of capital in the European banking sector. However, by their actions they only drew attention to the fact that, despite three stress tests in the EU since October 2009, despite the capital raising process, both to address identified weaknesses and in the context of the new Basel III requirements, European banks remain significantly undercapitalised, even with sovereign debt rollovers at face value. Furthermore, many European banks simply will not survive the revaluation of government bonds on their balance sheets to market value. The IMF also warns that in the Eurozone we are dealing with a sovereign debt crisis in the periphery combined with a potential insolvency crisis in the banking sector across Europe.
A Eurozone and EU banking crisis is likely to be triggered by a Greek exit from the Eurozone. The fundamental links between the real economy and finance of the Eurozone and the rest of the world are strong enough to make the problem global.
And it looks like it will.
Willem Beater, senior economist at Citi
DD has started to form on D1. If by TA, the targets are at the top
It would be nice to have a look at the weeks as well)))
You're talking about the trading system. I mean the market in general - the average TP/SL ratio in the market. I apologise for the jargon (figurative thinking), I did not immediately explain what I meant.
You're talking about the trading system. I mean the market in general - the average TP/SL ratio in the market. I apologize for the jargon (figurative thinking), I did not immediately explain what I meant.
I still don't have the imagination to understand this average ratio=1.
I left the Sell on Monday at SL=35 and TP is not there yet. One figurative thinking.
I still don't have enough figurative thinking to understand this average ratio=1.
I left the Sell for Monday SL=35 and no TP yet. One figurative thinking.
But calculating to take more than 35 ppt profit?)))
But calculating to take more than a 35 ppt profit?)))
on monday there's likely to be a euro-type scenario like the reddish clocks are showing
at least the first 4-5 hours...