The
London Stock Exchange (LSE) has been an institution caught in the midst
of political, economic and technological change. Systemic changes
sweeping through the industry have set off chain reactions of
demutualization, consolidation and diversification. The LSE has not been
immune to these changes, yet, it still stands more or less alone.
Adaptation,
for a mutual association with such a long history of independence and
such hidebound attitudes, was not easy. However, as compromise became a
necessity, and later, unavoidable exposure to global change became a
reality, the LSE found its feet in the new world order. As ambitions of
creating truly global exchanges grew, suitors also became more savvy
about how they approached the notoriously “hard to get” LSE.
This
paper explores the factors dictating the responses of the LSE to the
pressures of change. It is a cautionary tale, highlighting, among other
things the importance of institutional culture and personalities in the
exchange business. As large and significant financially as exchanges may
be, they are small, potentially closed worlds in other respects. In the
case of the LSE, the imperial past has also played a part. Rather than
looking outwards to engage internationally, as NASDAQ and the NYSE were
obliged to do, the City of London instead brought the world (in the form
of diversity of the markets, expertise and human capital) to London.
The most recent of a long string of merger negotiations, that of the LSE
and Deutsche Bӧrse, will test this strategy. Will the commercial and
institutional forces supporting the merger be strong enough to overcome
the political and regulatory uncertainty produced by Brexit?
This
paper appears as a chapter in a longer study, funded by the Centre for
International Finance and Regulation (Sydney, Australia), which
chronicles the major exchange consolidations of the last decade,
successful and unsuccessful.
Electronic trading
has transformed foreign exchange markets over the past decade, and the
pace of innovation only accelerates. This formerly opaque market is now
fairly transparent and transaction costs are only a fraction of their
former level. Entirely new agents have joined the fray, including retail
and high-frequency traders, while foreign exchange trading
volumes have tripled. Market concentration among dealers has risen
reflecting the heavy investments in technology. Undeterred, some new
non-bank market participants have begun to make markets, challenging the
traditional foreign exchange dealers on their own turf. This paper
outlines the players in this market and the structure of their
interactions. It also presents new evidence on how that structure has
changed over the past two decades. Throughout, it highlights issues
relevant to exchange rate modelling.
We investigate the profitability of the quantitative market timing technique of candlestick technicalanalysis
in the U.S. equity market. Despite being used for centuries in Japan
and now having a wide following amongst market practitioners globally,
there is little research documenting its profitability or otherwise. We
find that these strategies are not generally profitable when applied to
large U.S. stocks. Basing trading decisions solely on these techniques
does not seem sensible but we cannot rule out the possibility that they
compliment some other market timing techniques.
In this paper, we analyze the usefulness of technicalanalysis,
specifically the widely used moving average trading rule, from an asset
allocation perspective. We show that when stock returns are
predictable, technicalanalysis
adds value to commonly used allocation rules that invest fixed
proportions of wealth in stocks. When there is uncertainty about
predictability, the fixed allocation rules combined with technicalanalysis can outperform the prior-dependent optimal learning rule when the prior is not too informative. Moreover, the technical
trading rules are robust to model specification, and they tend to
substantially outperform the model-based optimal trading strategies when
there is uncertainty about the model governing the stock price.
We find that individual investors who use technicalanalysis
and trade options frequently make poor portfolio decisions, resulting
in dramatically lower returns than other investors. The data on which
this claim is based consists of transaction records and matched survey
responses of a sample of Dutch discount brokerage clients for the period
2000-2006. Overall, our results indicate that individual investors who
report using technicalanalysis
are disproportionately prone to have speculation on short-term
stock-market developments as their primary investment objective, hold
more concentrated portfolios which they turn over at a higher rate, are
less inclined to bet on reversals, choose risk exposures featuring a
higher ratio of nonsystematic risk to total risk, engage in more options
trading, and earn lower returns.
Using a
dynamical microeconomic model which generalizes the classical theory of
adjustment to include finite asset base and trend-based investment
preference, we develop a foundation for the technical
analyis (or charting) of securities. The mathematically complete system
of (deterministic) ordinary differential equations that has provided a
quantitative explanation of the laboratory bubbles experiments generates
a broad spectrum of patterns that are used by practitioners of technicalanalysis.
The origins of many of these patterns are classified as (i) those that
can be generated by the activities of a single group, and (ii) those
that can be generated by the presence of two or more groups with
asymmetric information. Examples of (i) include the head and shoulders,
double tops, rising wedge while (ii) includes pennants and symmetric
triangles. The system of differential equations is easily generalized to
stochastic ODE'S. Application is also made to Japanese candlestick analysis.
This study examines how fundamental accounting information can be used to supplement technical
information to separate momentum winners from losers. We first
introduce a ratio of liquidity buy volume to liquidity sell volume (BOS
ratio) to proxy the level of information asymmetry for stocks and show
that the BOS momentum strategy can enhance the profits of momentum
strategy. We further propose a unified framework, produced by
incorporating two fundamental indicators — the FSCORE (Piotroski, 2000)
and the GSCORE (Mohanram, 2005) — into momentum strategy. Empirical
results show that the combined investment strategy includes stocks with
larger information content that the market cannot reflect in time, and
therefore, the combined investment strategy outperforms momentum
strategy by generating significantly higher returns.
Managed-futures
funds and CTAs trade predominantly on trends. There are several ways of
identifying trends, either using heuristics or statistical measures
often called “filters.” Two important statistical measures of price
trends are time series momentum and movingaverage
crossovers. We show both empirically and theoretically that these trend
indicators are closely connected. In fact, they are equivalent
representations in their most general forms, and they also capture many
other types of filters such as the HP filter, the Kalman filter, and all
other linear filters. Further, we show how these filters can be
represented through “trend signature plots” showing their dependence on
past prices and returns by horizon. Our results unify and broaden a
range of trend-following strategies, and we discuss the implications for
investors.
Adaptation, for a mutual association with such a long history of independence and such hidebound attitudes, was not easy. However, as compromise became a necessity, and later, unavoidable exposure to global change became a reality, the LSE found its feet in the new world order. As ambitions of creating truly global exchanges grew, suitors also became more savvy about how they approached the notoriously “hard to get” LSE.
This paper explores the factors dictating the responses of the LSE to the pressures of change. It is a cautionary tale, highlighting, among other things the importance of institutional culture and personalities in the exchange business. As large and significant financially as exchanges may be, they are small, potentially closed worlds in other respects. In the case of the LSE, the imperial past has also played a part. Rather than looking outwards to engage internationally, as NASDAQ and the NYSE were obliged to do, the City of London instead brought the world (in the form of diversity of the markets, expertise and human capital) to London. The most recent of a long string of merger negotiations, that of the LSE and Deutsche Bӧrse, will test this strategy. Will the commercial and institutional forces supporting the merger be strong enough to overcome the political and regulatory uncertainty produced by Brexit?
This paper appears as a chapter in a longer study, funded by the Centre for International Finance and Regulation (Sydney, Australia), which chronicles the major exchange consolidations of the last decade, successful and unsuccessful.
Hi Guys,
For basic Trading most widely uses
1) trend trading
2) Support resistance breakout
- Pennant . flags recognition
3) fibonaci entrancement
4) candle Sticks recognition
5) Moving averages cross ( EMA/ Maverage )
4) Strong understanding of divserse environment in trading fundamental
Personally this is my MUST have Indicators ( I am a very EA and Indicator Person) sorry Naked Chart ain't my style
1) Average Day Range
2) Currency Meter
3) Currency Scanner
4) Trader Dynamic Index
5) Bull and Bear signals
6) Flags and Pennants
7) Education Modules and Indicators Manuals
8) Candles Recognition
1) Where is the strategy? These are some more or less bad indicators and attempts to use them.
2) Breakouts are good when you know that it is one. Traders often jump into bears or bulls traps and wonder why "the market is trolling" them.
3) IMO your 'MUST have' is a collection of "hands off" stuff, except the first of (7), but what you mean?
This is neither for beginners, advanceds, nor for masters.