Notwithstanding its widespread use and well documented profitability, technicalanalysis
is still not accepted by the academia. This may be due to the fact that
the causes of this profitability are not yet well understood. This
paper suggests a rational for the application of technical
trading rules. It is assumed that some of the asset price fundamentals
are observable only with a considerable lag or not observable at all.
Within this realistic informational environment a moving average trading
rule is able to detect possible regime shifts in the process of
currently unobservable fundamentals. Moving average trading rules can be
interpreted as a cheap proxy for Bayesian learning and complementary to
the standard forward looking approach of asset price expectations.
Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar coined the term “market manipulation”
in 1999 to describe how companies exploit the cognitive limitations of
consumers. Everything costs $9.99 because consumers see the price as closer to $9 than $10. Although widely cited by academics, the concept of market manipulation has had only a modest impact on consumer protection law.
This Article demonstrates that the concept of market manipulation
is descriptively and theoretically incomplete, and updates the
framework for the realities of a marketplace that is mediated by
technology. Today’s firms fastidiously study consumers and,
increasingly, personalize every aspect of their experience. They can
also reach consumers anytime and anywhere, rather than waiting for the
consumer to approach the marketplace. These and related trends mean that
firms can not only take advantage of a general understanding of
cognitive limitations, but can uncover and even trigger consumer frailty
at an individual level.
A new theory of digital market manipulation
reveals the limits of consumer protection law and exposes concrete
economic and privacy harms that regulators will be hard-pressed to
ignore. This Article thus both meaningfully advances the behavioral law
and economics literature and harnesses that literature to explore and
address an impending sea change in the way firms use data to persuade.
This paper studies the feedback loop between liquidity and predatorytrading.
On one hand, predators exploit the market illiquidity to move prices
and trigger a margin call on a rival trader (the prey)'s position. On
the other hand, the mere anticipation of the prey's firesales by other
market participants lowers the current price of the asset and changes
the liquidity the prey has access to: her price impact decreases, while
predators' increases. This makes predation cheaper from their viewpoint.
The model predicts that predatorytrading occurs in markets with low risk-bearing capacity, and shows that short-selling bans may be ineffective against predatorytrading.
The
purpose of this paper is to present simple quantitative methods that
improve risk-adjusted returns for investing in US equity sectors and
global asset class portfolios. A relative strength model is tested on
the French-Fama US equity sector data back to the 1920s that results in
increased absolute returns with equity-like risk. The relative strength
portfolios outperform the buy and hold benchmark in approximately 70% of
all years and returns are persistent across time. The addition of a
trend-following parameter to dynamically hedge the portfolio decreases
both volatility and drawdown. The relative strength model is then tested across a portfolio of global asset classes with supporting results.
This
study investigates the foreign exchange risk management program of HDG
Inc. (pseudonym), an industry leading manufacturer of durable equipment
with sales in more than 50 countries. The analysis
relies primarily on a three-month field study in the treasury of HDG.
Precise examination of factors affecting why and how the firm manages
its foreign exchange exposure are explored through the use of internal
firm documents, discussions with managers, and data on 3110
foreign-exchange derivative transactions over a three and a half year
period. Results indicate that several commonly cited reasons for
corporate hedging are probably not the primary motivation for why HDG
undertakes a risk management program. Instead, informational
asymmetries, facilitation of internal contracting, and competitive
pricing concerns seem to motivate hedging. How HDG hedges depends on
accounting treatment, derivative market liquidity, foreign exchange
volatility, exposure volatility, technical factors, and recent hedging outcomes.
The underlying concept behind the technicaltrading
indicators based on moving averages of prices has remained unaltered
for more than half of a century. The development in this field has
consisted in proposing new ad-hoc rules and using more elaborate types
of moving averages in the existing rules, without any deeper analysis of
commonalities and differences between miscellaneous choices for trading
rules and moving averages. The first contribution of this paper is to
uncover the anatomy of market timing rules with moving averages. Our
analysis offers a new and very insightful reinterpretation of the
existing rules and demonstrates that the computation of every trading
indicator can equivalently be interpreted as the computation of a
weighted moving average of price changes. Therefore the performance of
any moving average trading
rule depends exclusively on the shape of the weighting function for
price changes. The second contribution of this paper is a
straightforward application of the useful knowledge revealed by our
analysis. Specifically, we evaluate the out-of-sample performance of 300
various shapes of the weighting function for price changes using
historical data on four financial market indices. The goal of this
exercise is to suggest answers to long-standing questions about optimal
types of moving averages and whether the best performing trading rule can beat the passive counterpart in out-of-sample tests.
This study employs the Simple Moving Average (SMA) and the Displaced Moving Average (DMA) trading
rules to test the weak form efficiency of the Indian equity markets.
The indicators were applied on the S&P CNX Nifty, BSE Sensex as well
as multiple individual stocks for a time period spanning 15 years
(1991-2005). Our results provide sufficient evidence that the DMA
indicator is a highly successful trading rule that generated profitable signals even after adjusting for transaction and other costs.
The supply/demand
of a security in the market is an intertemporal, not a static, object
and its dynamics are crucial in determining market participants' trading behavior. Previous studies on the optimal trading strategy to execute a given order focuses mostly on the static properties of the supply/demand. In this paper, we show that the dynamics of the supply/demand are of critical importance to the optimal execution strategy, especially when trading times are endogenously chosen. Using the limit-order-book market, we develop a simple framework to model the dynamics of supply/demand
and their impact on execution cost. We show that the optimal execution
strategy involves both discrete and continuous trades, not only
continuous trades as previous work suggested. The cost savings from the
optimal strategy over the simple continuous strategy can be substantial.
We also show that the predictions about the optimal trading behavior can have interesting implications on the observed behavior of intraday volume, volatility and prices.
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Anybody has the : Exponentially Decaying Weighted Moving Average?
techmac
From information I could collect, that is simply EMA (just another name)
Good study. Thanks
This Article demonstrates that the concept of market manipulation is descriptively and theoretically incomplete, and updates the framework for the realities of a marketplace that is mediated by technology. Today’s firms fastidiously study consumers and, increasingly, personalize every aspect of their experience. They can also reach consumers anytime and anywhere, rather than waiting for the consumer to approach the marketplace. These and related trends mean that firms can not only take advantage of a general understanding of cognitive limitations, but can uncover and even trigger consumer frailty at an individual level.
A new theory of digital market manipulation reveals the limits of consumer protection law and exposes concrete economic and privacy harms that regulators will be hard-pressed to ignore. This Article thus both meaningfully advances the behavioral law and economics literature and harnesses that literature to explore and address an impending sea change in the way firms use data to persuade.